fix: prevent command injection via docker options eval
Values supplied through docker options, `--ttl-seconds`, and `-e` flowed into a Bash `eval` during build, deploy, and run, letting a low-privileged user execute arbitrary commands on the host as the dokku user. These arguments are now tokenized and passed through to the container verbatim, without shell expansion. A one-time migration repairs stored labels whose backticks were saved with a stray backslash so Traefik-style rules stay valid on the next deploy.
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@@ -285,6 +285,25 @@ teardown() {
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assert_output "/tmp:{} /var/tmp:{}"
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}
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@test "(docker-options) deploy does not expand command substitution in option values [buildpacks]" {
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run /bin/bash -c "dokku docker-options:add $TEST_APP deploy '--label=com.dokku.test=\$(id)'"
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echo "output: $output"
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echo "status: $status"
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assert_success
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run deploy_app
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echo "output: $output"
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echo "status: $status"
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assert_success
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CID=$(<$DOKKU_ROOT/$TEST_APP/CONTAINER.web.1)
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run /bin/bash -c "docker inspect $CID --format '{{ index .Config.Labels \"com.dokku.test\" }}'"
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echo "output: $output"
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echo "status: $status"
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assert_output '$(id)'
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[[ "$output" != *"uid="* ]] || flunk "id command output leaked - option value was expanded"
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}
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@test "(docker-options) deploy with options [dockerfile]" {
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run /bin/bash -c "dokku docker-options:add $TEST_APP deploy \"-v /var/tmp\""
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echo "output: $output"
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